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German Commercial Air Transport until 1945
Hans-Liudger DlENEL & Martin Schiefelbusch
Centre for Technology and Society, Technical University Berlin

-- Introduction 
-- The Lufthansa: A Historiographical Status Quaestionis  
-- Zeppelins: German Enthusiasm for Lighter-than-Air Aviation  
--  Air-mindedness as an Expression of National Defiance: Versailles and its Consequences  
-- Building a Trust: The Foundation of Lufthansa by State Decree  
-- Hopping Across the Country: Domestic Air Routes and German Federalism 
-- Flying as a Patriotic Deed: Lufthansa's Passengers  
-- Let's Fly! Lufthansa's Technological and Operational Strategies  
-- Lufthansa's Atlantic Orientation  
-- In the Hands of the Luftwaffe: Lufthansa and the Re-arming of Germany   
-- The European Airline: Lufthansa during World War II  
-- Conclusions and Outlook 

This article aims at presenting the external framework for the foundation and development of commercial airlines in Germany during the inter-war period, with special emphasis on Lufthansa. At the same time, it seeks to derive from Lufthansa's inter-war history some explanations for the peculiar history of the German flag carrier until 1945 and beyond.
The Lufthansa - or Luft Hansa, as it was called until the early 1930s - had been for some time the largest German and until World War II always the largest European air carrier. It had pioneered important technological and operational innovations such as the first scheduled overnight air services or the technology for instrument-based flying, which permitted non-visual takeoffs and landing in poor weather conditions. This innovative drive was significant in civil aircraft production, as well. In 1925, almost 40% of new aircraft used by carriers world-wide had been built at, or under licence of, the Junkers Werke in Dessau 1
The relatively high importance of civil aviation along with the great interest of large parts of the German population in aircraft and aviation -also compared with other countries- contrasted sharply with the highly restrictive conditions imposed by the Versailles peace. One can, however, try to explain the history of the Lufthansa -as have both contemporaries and historians- as an act of defiance against the control, restrictions and prohibitions of the victorious powers 2. Following this interpretation, the restrictions of Versailles actually increased in Germany the interest and willingness to support new developments, at the same time necessitating a number of special technological solutions which despite all limitations had positive effects on the development of civil aviation. Restrictions limiting engine power, for instance, indirectly promoted research on aerodynamics and the further spread of gliding. The
restrictions of Versailles and the German response, therefore, constitute one of the main points of this paper, which will otherwise focus on the specificities of the German development as a complement to the other European carriers discussed in this volume. It will explore how the economic and technological tasks of civil aviation -essentially similar all over Europe- were addressed and solved in Germany.
In addition to the conditions imposed by Versailles, three other specific factors shall be identified as key to the development of civil aviation in Germany. These are the loss of the colonies, the pre-war tradition of "lighter than air" Zeppelin-based aviation and the federal, polycentral structure of the Reich. The analytical sections are preceded by a brief historiographical review.

The Lufthansa: A Historiographical Status Quaestionis (the state of investigation

The majority of the literature on the history of Lufthansa to date is largely popular in character. Although civil aviation in Germany does not receive the same journalistic attention as in the United States, where aviation is part of the national culture and folklore, regarding the sheer number of publications it nevertheless exceeds all other areas of technological and entrepreneurial history - with the sole exception of the railways. This "train station literature" targets an audience of aviation enthusiasts and concentrates mainly on military aviation, aircraft production, the early days of flying, record-breaking flights, adventures, the so-called "general" (i.e. individual) aviation, spectacular air disasters and safety problems. Because of the large print runs, the potential degree of effort and attention invested in these publications is actually quite significant, and their informational value therefore often correspondingly reliable 3. At the upper end of these sources, the series "Die Deutsche Luftfahrt" -of which 30 volumes have so far been published- provides a professional, often very detailed analysis, with an overall bias towards military aviation, and most of its contributions are authored by retired engineers. In 1987, Wolfgang Wagner published, in the same series, a volume on the early history of air transport up to the foundation of Lufthansa 4. Bernd-Marian Appel, in his doctoral dissertation, also studied the subject, but from the perspective of economic history. While Wagner concentrated on the work of the pioneers in aircraft construction, air companies and pilots, Appel explored the activities of the public administration (based on ministerial records), quantified state support for aviation and described the political context of the founding of Lufthansa 5. A continuation of Wagner's work has recently been presented in the series "Die Deutsche Luftfahrt" by the aviation author Karl-Dieter Seifert, who had previously published a volume on Interflug (Lufthansa's East-German counterpart), and the east-German airports 6.
Similarly, business-history studies of Lufthansa and other German carriers are typically not of a scholarly historical character. Thus, the most detailed history of the company to date was written by the former Lufthansa-pilot Rudolf Braunburg 7. His strength is clearly his graphic narrative style, for he can tell a good story, the text abounds in lively anecdotes, and old Lufthansa staff members are quoted extensively. Since 1975, Lufthansa itself has had its corporate history written up at regular intervals by the journalist Joachim Wachtel 8. These contributions also differ little in style from the "vivid and personal" descriptions of other carriers 9. An American view on Lufthansa by the renowned aviation historian R.E.G. Davies highlights the Junkers tradition and the technical triumphs in crossing the Atlantic 10. The autobiographies of the founding fathers of Lufthansa, Milch, von Schack, Weigelt and Bongers, which confirm the technological ambitions and Atlantic orientation of the carrier, have their own particular character 11. Comparative approaches with other carriers and their commercial rise are rare 12. Luft Hansa Anzeige. Die Luftreise vom Oktober 1932

From a perspective of cultural history, several relevant history-of-mentality studies examining the growing enthusiasm for flying have been published since the 1980s. Wolfgang Behringer's work aside 13, one should above all note the work of Peter Fritzsche and, for a comparison of England and the United States, the studies of David Edgerton and Joseph J. Corn 14. In his book A Nation of Fliers, Fritzsche provides convincing evidence for the - on the European level - unusually large and widespread enthusiasm for flying in the inter-war period. Similar conclusions are drawn by another American study, that of Guillaume de Syon on the Zeppelin 15.
One expression and legacy of this "air-mindedness" is the large number of professional publications addressing the significance of civil aviation in the 1930s in the fields of economics and political science 16. Indeed, civil aviation has proven to be a rather fashionable subject for PhD-dissertations 17. The young discipline of transportation sciences, in which Germany -as in many other spatial planning sciences- has taken an institutional lead, has also focussed on aviation issues 18.
Surprisingly, competition with other modes of transport, and passenger choice of means of transport has not found much attention in the history of aviation despite the fact that aircraft had to compete everywhere with already established transport systems. This lacuna in scholarship has been repeatedly
criticised in the past 19. The history of aviation infrastructure, in particular the development of airports, is also of particular interest, yet few scholarly historical studies are available and existing studies rarely go beyond a Festschrift- like description of its development and expansion 20.
Among unpublished source collections, the fine Lufthansa archive and the aviation collections of the Deutsches Museum in Munich - in particular the Junkers archive - are the most important 21. The records of individual aircraft producers and the "Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher Verkehrsflughäfen" (association of airports) 22, and for the public sector activities the records of the Reichs and regional (Länder) ministries 23 constitute a further significant source group.

Zeppelins: German Enthusiasm for Lighter-than-Air Aviation 

The greater importance of flying lighter than air with Zeppelins, which until the 1936 Lakehurst disaster had an important influence on German civil aviation, must be seen as peculiar to Germany. Zeppelin construction could count on a broad national consensus. After the 1908 Echterdingen disaster a National Zeppelin Collection supported by all parts of the population was founded, and opposition against lighter-than-air flying became virtually equated with treason 24.
The development of aircraft for lighter-than-air flying was promoted in Germany with greater intensity and over a longer time than in any other country and is peculiar to the German course of aviation history. This remains true until today. The new Zeppelin NT, developed in Friedrichshafen and Berlin, currently evokes much enthusiasm, and its future prospects in freight and passenger transport (tourism) are seen as good. In the first half of the 20th century, Zeppelin construction influenced significantly aircraft development, most no
tably in the field of lightweight constructions. Indeed, the Dornier and Rohrbach aircraft factories grew out of the Zeppelin works in Friedrichshafen 25.
There was, however - from the beginning - also opposition against state support for the Zeppelin, even in Germany. The Berlin intellectual Maximilian Harden, who in a 1913 article had argued for increased support for aircraft (as against Zeppelin) development, described the general feeling towards the Zeppelin in Germany as follows: "Doubt squints and mistrust creeps in from all corners, but no general will exists to arm itself with the courage of conviction" 26. Harden saw the cause for this reaction in the excessively nationalistic pride of the Germans in their contribution to the development of aviation, enhanced by the popularity of its inventor and his close links to the system as such 27.
Furthermore, the Zeppelin boasted an in all respects impressive aesthetic appearance, making it different from the other technological innovations of the early 20th century. Indeed, the passing-by of a Zeppelin constitutes a crucial part of the collective memory of the 1920s and 30s 28. In his 1991 review, the Lufthansa pilot Rudolf Braunberg puts it like this: "The most sensational plane could not match the popularity, admiration and euphoria of the German Zeppelins! The rising sound of a mysterious rumbling coming closer, the majestic whirr of the propellers, the approach of a giant shadow... and the Zeppelin passes majestically" 29.
However, rational arguments were also advanced in favor of the Zeppelin in civil aviation, where its availability preceded that of the airplane 30. On 16 October 1909 the then largest shipping company in the world, HAPAG, set up the "Deutsche Luftschiffahrts AG" (Delag) together with Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH. By 1914, the new company had carried more than 37,000 paying passengers, using the Deutschland (put in service in 1910 with a cabin for 24 passengers) and six other Zeppelins, albeit on excursions rather than scheduled services.
After the war - in the summer of 1919 - Delag introduced scheduled flights with the Bodensee, providing a daily service between Friedrichshafen and Berlin. However, according to the Versailles treaty, the Zeppelins had to be surrendered to the victorious powers and so Zeppelin aviation in Germany
came to an end. Not until the construction of LZ 124 Los Angeles, as a reparation payment for the United States, was a turning point reached, and for the first time, German Zeppelin production was once again authorized. In the meantime, international aircraft construction had developed significantly and the only market segment in which the Zeppelin still had a chance to compete was on long-distance intercontinental flights. Consequently, the company from Friedrichshafen consistently targeted these routes. Another, nation-wide Zeppelin collection permitted the construction, in 1926, of LZ 127 Graf Zeppelin which in 1928 crossed the northern Atlantic for the first time, followed by the southern Atlantic in 1930. The Zeppelin became one of the main symbols for the recovered Germany and very important for international recognition and sympathy 31. This helps explain why company director Eckener and Zeppelin construction could rely on the financial and political support of the Reich government 32. In 1932 the Graf Zeppelin inaugurated a regular service to Brazil with approximately 20 trips per year 33, followed four years later by scheduled flights to New York with the Hindenburg with 32 departures in 1936 34. For this purpose, the Reich ministry for aviation had founded the operating company "Deutsche Zeppelin Reederei" in 1935, together with Deutsche Lufthansa and Luftschiffbau Zeppelin. Indeed, Zeppelins remained the first and only air link across the Atlantic until the Lakehurst disaster on 7 May 1937 brought a sudden end to the Zeppelin era. They were perceived as safe and their future for intercontinental services was considered bright. As late as 1936, the Brazilian government built a Zeppelin port in Rio de Janeiro as an extension to the route that so far had ended in Recife 35.
On the other hand, seaplanes and four-engine long-distance airplanes were increasingly challenging the Zeppelin's market position. After the loss of the Hindenburg, the ministry withdrew its support for Zeppelin construction and operation. The already completed LZ 130 Graf Zeppelin, the last and fastest airship in the German fleet, was scrapped in 1940 36.
The most important and lasting legacy of the Zeppelin era for Lufthansa remained the successful establishment of services on the two Atlantic routes. Here Germany was undoubtedly leading and Lufthansa - despite competing technologies and the fact that it was only one of several shareholders of the
Zeppelin Reederei - could present itself ideally as the technologically leading carrier. As we shall see, the momentum of this success was to influence and define Lufthansa's network development policy up to the 1970s 37.

Air-mindedness as an Expression of National Defiance: Versailles and its Consequences 

The German defeat in World War I changed the political framework for the development of civil aviation completely. The Versailles treaty, signed 28 June 1919 by the Reich government, prohibited absolutely both the possession and development of air forces 38. The only authorized exceptions were 100 seaplanes for mine-sweeping operations to be terminated by October 1919, and 145 ex-military aircraft for civil aviation. Until 1 January 1923 the allied forces exercised air sovereignty over Germany. While the unconditional prohibition of aircraft production was originally meant to last only six months, the delaying attitude of the Reich government provoked its extension until 5 May 1922. In practice, however, it was frequently ignored, and in doing so, aircraft plants could rely on government support, and demonstrative visits of state representatives from the executive and legislature were normal practice. German companies also built aircraft abroad, again with Reich support: Junkers produced in Fili near Moscow, Dornier in Italy and Rohrbach in Denmark. Among the Junkers engineers in Fili was none other than Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev, later to become one of the most renowned Russian aviation engineers.
A condition for suspending the prohibitions was the timely enactment of the so-called Begriffsbestimmungen (terminological definitions) which restricted aircraft construction to civil airplanes, agreed upon by Allies and Reich on 14 April 1922. The Begriffsbestimmungen limited design to small dimensions, low speeds and comparatively weak engines. Ironically, this prohibition shaped the technological evolution in German aircraft construction and in many ways promoted innovation, i.e. in the areas of lightweight construction, self-supporting structures and aerodynamic research 39. Furthermore, the areas which were allowed were intensively developed, so that since the 1920s, Germany became the world leader in aerodynamics and wind-tunnel research; Göttingen, Adlershof near Berlin and in the Nazi period Braunschweig became virtual Meccas of aviation research 40. On the other
hand, restrictive regulations of course hindered development, too. Large planes such as the DoX had to rely on American engines up to the 1930s. Development restrictions also led to a lasting under-dimensioning of engines.
Another result of Versailles, which greatly influenced civil aviation, was the loss of the German colonies. While the carriers of the victorious powers - France and England in particular, but also the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy - built up intercontinental services to their colonies, German companies and aircraft producers concentrated on short- and medium-haul routes. Not until in the 1920s, helped by the development of the Zeppelin and seaplanes, did long-distance services - across the Atlantic and to East Asia - receive more attention and support in Germany. These German activities, however, were generally more business-oriented and also more successful economically than those of the other countries.
In sum then, the Allied conditions imposed at Versailles were not only less restrictive for German aircraft construction than expected, on the contrary they often provided a lasting stimulus. On the one hand, national resistance against the restrictions increased the willingness to subsidise aircraft construction and civil aviation 41. And such investments were not limited to public aviation subsidies. For private individuals, buying an air ticket and being an air passenger were seen as a "patriotic deed", a sign of resistance against Versailles and of trust in Germany's resurgent role in the skies (Deutsche Luftgeltung) 42. As an aircraft engineer and airlines director with a reliable instinct for the public mood, Hugo Junkers successfully converted these feelings into political and financial support for his activities of the 1920s 43.
Furthermore, Allied restrictions inspired technical development in many ways, and with net positive results. Engine size restrictions promoted aerodynamic research, while the prohibition of military aircraft necessitated the concentration on civil planes. In civil aviation, war never was and still is not the father of all things. This was also true in the United States, where the Douglas DC 3 - the single most important civil plane for the post-war period - was based on a pre-war design. Military developments during World War II, however, did of course provide the technological preconditions for civil jet aircraft. The first turbine jets from Heinkel and Messerschmitt were revving up in Germany while the war was still in process. In 1945, the Allies confiscated these planes along with the results of swept-back wing research, which were subsequently taken over by the United States and the Soviet Union - less so by
England, which had its own turbine development 44. On the other hand, German aircraft of the inter-war period were notorious for their insufficient motors. The advantage of this "German disease", which often created safety problems, was reduced petrol consumption; its drawback low speeds and loading capacity as well as takeoff problems 45.

Building a Trust: The Foundation of Lufthansa by State Decree 

The "Deutsche Luft-Reederei" (DLR, literally German air-shipping company) is generally considered the first civil air company in the world (apart from the previously mentioned Delag) for the operation of Zeppelin services. It started scheduled flights on 5 February 1919 with a daily service Berlin -Weimar (ca. 200 km). French and English companies soon followed suit. The oldest of these still in existence is the Dutch KLM. Within one summer, Europe was covered by a dense network of air services, even though this was largely operated by old ex-military aircraft.
All over Europe, the large number of small, private operators, some of which had powerful owners, were forced by public pressure to merge into national carriers. In England in 1924, the government required several small companies to form Imperial Airways. In France, this concentration took place in two phases: in 1923 with the foundation of Air Union and, ten years later, following massive state pressure, its merger with three other airlines into Air France 46.
In Germany, 37 small air operators existed in 1923. The majority of these received support from cities, counties, districts or regions. However, as early as 1924 two distinct big groups emerged, the Deutsche Aero-Lloyd and the Junkers Luftverkehr. The key role of Junkers for the development of civil aviation and airlines must be explained biographically rather than structurally. Junkers was a self-confident, eccentric, motivating and globally-thinking entrepreneur-engineer who was able to inspire both civil aircraft development and aviation at the same time. Without any doubt he can be described as one of the premier charismatic business and engineering figures of the inter-war period, with the consequent public acclaim 47. In 1919, the first all-metal aircraft
of the world, the Junkers F13, was already available as a robust cabin plane for four passengers. The self-supporting "thick wing" design for low-wing airplanes, first applied by Junkers, was a major innovation influencing aircraft construction to this day. To better market his planes after the war, Junkers first tried building a close relationship with all the airline operators. He also became shareholder of one company, Lloyd Ostflug, part of the air services of the large shipping company Großer Norddeutscher Lloyd. However, at the end of 1921 he left this - in his view not very dynamic - enterprise, and founded an air transport section within his own company. Gotthard Sachsenberg became the chief of this unit. Better sales perspectives for aircraft was an important reason for this foundation. From then on, the Junkers air transport unit participated in the foundation of many commercial airlines, both national and international, and Junkers' share of the start-up capital was provided by aircraft deliveries. Companies in which Junkers was involved usually received a discount of one third of the purchase price. With this strategy, 28 operators (of which 15 abroad) were founded by 1925. In Germany Junkers, as well as his competitors, tried to broaden their economic base by integrating communities and other businesses. In 1923, Junkers reorganised the air transport unit by establishing two holding companies - Trans-Europa-Union and Nord-Europa-Union - aimed at creating a network of Junkers-controlled air services, at least in Europe 48. In 1924 40% of the global production of civil aircraft was provided by Junkers. This development was mainly due to the success of the F13, which had made its maiden flight in 1919 49. By 1925, however, many competitors had caught up with the technological standard set by Junkers' planes and the company began losing its leading position. Junkers had overreached economically and become dangerously dependent on public funds through subsided investments in production plants abroad. Thus the government was able to use its power in late 1925 to force Junkers into the merger with Aero-Lloyd 50.
In 1923, the "Deutsche Aero-Lloyd" itself had also been formed by a merger, in the event between the Aero Union - AEG, Hapag and Zeppelin Luftschiffbau were the shareholders - and Lloyd Luftdienst, backed by Hapag's Bremen competitor Norddeutscher Lloyd in cooperation with Deutsche Bank and Deutsche Petroleum AG. Thus it was the shipping companies who together with banks and industry took a leading role in both air companies. The capital, however, was provided mainly by the banks. At its foundation in 1923, 40 banks, five aircraft producers and many other industrial
companies participated with significant contributions, an indicator of the great expectations placed in the economic perspectives of commercial aviation. In contrast, and due also to the disappointing financial results of the inter-war period, the young Lufthansa until 1963 had great difficulties in finding private sector partners.
By 1923, the Deutsche Aero-Lloyd had not only united its predecessors and taken over numerous other small operators, but also set up additional regional subsidiaries. At the end of that year, it was operating ten companies (eight in Germany) and was shareholder in six others, one of which in Austria 51. A driving force for these out-sourcing and founding activities was the regional promotion of aviation described above.
All in all, the emergence of a civil aviation trust could not be denied, even before Lufthansa's foundation. Unlike in the United States, for example, German economic policy had no pronounced negative opinion of monopolies during the inter-war period 52. Quite to the contrary. Public pressure led to certain industrial sectors being organized into compulsory cartels. In civil aviation, the state could enforce its economic and political ideas with special ease as it often played an important role as investor (through subsidies), customer (for air mail in particular), regulator and also operator. Much like regional support had favored the setting-up of many small airlines, overall state influence from autumn 1925 on led to a forced cooperation between the two trusts. Resistance was greater on the Junkers side than at Aero-Lloyd. This was due not only to the heightened ideological stress on private initiative at the former, but also due to Junkers' greater international success. The Reich government used the debt Junkers had built up as a result of state support for aircraft construction abroad (in the Soviet Union in particular) for a hostile takeover and, having become the majority shareholder, forced Junkers to agree to the merger in October 1925. As early as 6 January 1926, then, the Deutsche Luft Hansa AG was founded in the Kaiserhof Hotel in Berlin - as yet without the participation of regions and cities 53.
The three-member board of governors consisted of Otto Julius Merkel, Martin Wronsky (both ex Aero-Lloyd) and Erhard Milch (ex Junkers). Walter Luz (Aero-Lloyd) became Commercial Manager and Carl August von Gablenz (Junkers) Operations Manager. The two predecessors brought 165 aircraft (19 different models) into the new company.
Attempts to standardize the fleet failed dismally in the first years. Follow
ing the purchase of modern equipment, by 1929 the number of aircraft had risen to 181, spread over 28 models 54.

Hopping Across the Country: Domestic Air Routes and German Federalism 

With Lufthansa's foundation as a unified company, the Reich had been successful in pushing through its interests against the combatants, but also against the local interests of regions and cities. This consequently fuelled the local outcry and demands for adequate representation in the company. In the following months, i.e. (id est) by the time of the shift to the summer timetable, regions and cities had largely succeeded in ensuring that their transport needs were considered by Lufthansa.
Their participation in the share capital and distribution of posts on the board of directors was a further visible manifestation of the influence of the cities. Among the impressive number of 63 members in the first term of office beginning in 1926, there were 11 mayors alone (representing Cologne, Essen, Leipzig, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Mülheim, Erfurt, Duisburg, Bochum, Munich and Halle). The mayors' prime concern was that the new Lufthansa consider their local interests.
Cities, provinces and regions possessed yet another tool by which they could exercise leverage on Lufthansa, i.e. the subsidies which continued to be paid not to Lufthansa, but to regional airlines who lacked their own equipment and contracted services out to Lufthansa. In the Rhineland this was, e.g. (exempli gratia), the "Luftverkehrsgesellschaft Ruhrgebiet", but there were also Luftverkehr Ostpreussen, Pommern, Thüringen, Schlesische and Brandenburgische Luftverkehrs AG, and many others 55. The federal structure of Germany thus not only influenced the large number and small size of operators in the early 1920s but continued to have its effect - after the 1926 foundation of Lufthansa - in the form of a very dense domestic routes network. This included so-called short-stop lines {Hopserlinien), which were jealously guarded by the dozen mayors and the even greater number of representatives of the regional ministries. The many stops and interruptions proved a major drawback for air services, in particular when competing with the fast trains, and scientists of transport voiced strong criticism against this small-scale philosophy of German commercial aviation s6. Consequently, "The limitation of short-distance trans
port and the expansion of long-haul services" were defined as an "organisational target" 57.
Lufthansa over time accepted and internalized this critique. Inner-German air services came to be viewed as a concession to circumstances, would always be in deficit, and could at best be justified as feeders for international routes. Such was the position of the newly-founded post-war Lufthansa, too. This attitude can best be understood as a reflex to the political pressure on the pre-war company to set up and operate unprofitable domestic routes. Because of this attitude, Lufthansa was incapable of recognizing and exploiting the opportunities that developed in this market during the initial post-war period. Only when new competitors appeared after deregulation - e.g. the Deutsche Β A - and successfully challenged Lufthansa's position on the domestic market did its outlook change, so that national services were perceived as an attractive area of operations and investment was considered urgent 58.
In the inter-war period it was of course true that profitability could be achieved more easily on longer routes 59. On long-haul routes the competitive advantage of air transport is greater and profitable prices can be charged more easily. However, this need not be true in the long term. Today Lufthansa often generates a greater profit on short-distance flights than on long routes, e.g. an economy-class ticket Berlin-Frankfurt costs as much as a Berlin-New York ticket. On the other hand, the federal, centrality structure of the German air service network also had positive effects for the competitive position of air transport. It offered attractive connections not only to the capital, but also between the regions in a spatially quite balanced network which existed in a similar kind only in the United States. In 1930, Lufthansa served 40 airports in Germany with regular flights, in 1980 only eleven remained 60.

Flying as a Patriotic Deed: Lufthansa's Passengers 

Why did people use Lufthansa and the other companies in the inter-war period? The passengers' views, their motivations and experiences constitute a gap in most studies of the history of civil aviation despite the availability of sources, in particular travel accounts.

Peter Fritzsche pointed out that the "air-mindedness" of the period had direct consequences for the civil aviation market. A "nation of fliers" was prepared to make sacrifices for the opportunity to fly, i.e. to pay for a ticket, wait, and finally board a plane. In the inter- war period in Germany, flying was more than in other European countries considered a patriotic deed 61.
To get from A to Β quickly was only one of many motivations for flying in the early days of civil aviation. Since its beginning, the share of leisure travel was significant and played a major role for modal choice. Most studies on the history of civil aviation underestimate this experience-based or leisure traffic and focus instead on business travel where time savings are the decisive factor 62. However, it can be demonstrated that not only the time saved, but also the experience of flying itself, made passengers opt for the airplane. Indeed, the first kind of mass air transport was sightseeing flights and later on seaside tours from Berlin to the coast, at Warnemiinde. Here, the leisure element is obvious. For business users of scheduled services, the recreational element is, of course, more difficult to prove. In the GDR seaside flights, however, were a main element of air travel both during the inter-war and post-war periods. Then as now, flying and holiday were closely linked.
Up to World War II, however, actual time savings achieved on Lufthansa's short-stop services, as compared to rail travel, were often minimal, while flights in fact sometimes even took longer than travel by train 63.

Let's Fly! Lufthansa's Technological and Operational Strategies 

A third particularity of Lufthansa was the high technological standard Lufthansa claimed for itself, which manifested itself not so much in safety standards but more in the introduction of new technologies, in particular flying by instruments.
From the outset, Lufthansa saw itself a leader in technology. One of the big projects fitting this self-image was the introduction of flight operations independent of daylight and weather with instrument-based and night-flying.
Until the mid- 1920s civil aircraft only flew during the day, only from April to October and only if the weather was good. If civil aviation was to compete seriously with the railways, both flight reliability and punctuality had to be improved radically.

In this context, the whole range of services offered by Lufthansa served as a laboratory for the engineers intent on improving punctuality and reliability. Two innovations characterised the young Lufthansa, flying by night and - even more important - flying by instruments.
Together with the subsidiary Deruluft the young company started an overnight service Berlin-Königsberg (Kaliningrad)-Moscow on 1 May 1926. This was, however, an extremely costly operation. Every 30 to 35 km large revolving floodlights were put up. Next to these, emergency landing strips were provided and supervised by air control guards. Every 4-5 km further "secondary lights" were installed. At the airports, arc lamps produced a pale light when the plane started or arrived. Gas and neon lights marked the airfield limits: green for the approach, white for the touchdown point and red for the end of the runway. Berlin-Tempelhof was the first airport to follow this concept and thus defined standards that are still valid today. During the first three years, Lufthansa performed 1,271 night flights. There were eight accidents, and of these four were only minor.
Flying by instruments alone was much more demanding and constituted the precondition for services independent of weather conditions. Completely new instruments were necessary to tell the pilot how to steer his plane. These were the Wendezeiger (a gyroscope-type tool which indicated whether the plane was flying straight or in a curve), the airspeed-indicator and altimeter, as well as the old compass. Furthermore, since 1927 aircraft were equipped with radio communications systems. The Lufthansa had pioneered radio direction finding with the so-called "zz-procedure", which itself was soon improved using VHF beacon emitters. When following the guiding stream, the pilot heard a continuous medium-frequency tone which turned into long Morse signals if he diverted to the right, and short ones if he turned to the left.
Flying by instruments, as required by Operations Manager von Gablenz, was opposed by a number of pilots as too dangerous, who also contended it weakened the pilot's necessary instinct. Von Gablenz countered this by introducing mandatory instruments-only training flights during good weather.
In this respect, flying by instruments had a technological and a human dimension. On the one hand, Lufthansa developed the necessary equipment and training, on the other hand it appealed to the courage and staying power of its staff. This was exemplified by the slogan, "When other airlines stay on the ground - Lufthansa flies!" Looking back, some pilots criticized the contempt for humanity that was part of this strategy. The unconditional "No matter what - we fly !"-attitude is understandable only before the background of the Nazi- ideology of bravery, courage, toughness, tenacity, Krupp-steel, loyalty and sacrifices for the nation 64.

Lufthansa's Atlantic Orientation 
We have already seen Lufthansa's Atlantic orientation in the context of the Zeppelin services. Once again: Germany had lost its colonies after World War I and thus a main destination and reason to subsidise intercontinental air services had ceased to exist, i.e. providing fast connections to the colonies. However, already Junkers had begun making plans, in the early 1920s, for developing long-distance services to East Asia, mainly with the intention of selling aircraft. Lufthansa continued these activities, but soon its main interest was the routes across the Northern and Southern Atlantic.
In South America, the large group of ethnic Germans as well as Germany's economic interests played a key role, and in the early 1920s several national air carriers were founded there, with German support. Here, too, the sale of aircraft provided a major incentive. Due to the widespread absence of railway routes, these companies broke even as early as the 1930s.
The Atlantic routes, however, were technologically most demanding due to the lacking possibilities for intermediate stops. This proved useful for German ambitions in civil aviation. Until 1935 there was no air force and Lufthansa was the only testing ground for aircraft development. Therefore it needed routes which posed technological challenges.
In April 1928 the Germans Köhl and von Hünefeld together with the Irish flight officer Fitzmaurice managed to complete the first east-west crossing of the Atlantic. Due to the predominating westerly winds this was more difficult than crossing in the other direction. This feat and the crew's friendly reception with a confetti parade in New York led to widespread enthusiasm in Germany, which at the time was still treated with international contempt. Later in the same year, Lufthansa presented new plans for regular Atlantic services 65. In 1930 Wolfgang von Gronau flew from Rostock- Warnemiinde to New York with a Dornier Wal seaplane, and from 1929 on, Lufthansa cooperated with the two big Atlantic shipping companies (Norddeutscher Lloyd and Hapag) in an intermodal travel chain. Catapult aircraft started from their mother-ships approximately 300 miles before the coast and thus reduced the time of mail transport.

(Aircraft type Dornier Do 8-1 Wal Wing span: 23,20 m Length: 18,20 m Passenger seats: 0 (Postflugboot / Mail- seaplane, Speed: 225 km/h Range: 2000 km In Lufthansa service: 1931-1935
On June 6, 1933, Lufthansa crossed the South Atlantic with a Dornier Wal seaplane by stopping over at the base-ship "Westfalen" to be serviced and relaunched by catapult. Here the seaplane is launched by catapult)

A similar service was provided on the southern Atlantic since 1930. In 1933 Lufthansa converted this into an air-only service with two catapult boats as fixed service points along the route. On the northern Atlantic, the intermodal chain remained in use until 1937 due to the more difficult weather of that region. In 1935, almost 200 such flights were operated. From 1937 the solution with stationary catapult boats was introduced here, as well, for mail transport only. In August 1938, a four-engine Focke-Wulf Condor flew nonstop from Berlin to New York, bringing an end to seaplane and catapult operations. With these services, Lufthansa had established itself as the leading operator on both parts of the ocean. Shortly before the introduction of scheduled services, flights had to be suspended because of the war.
Having almost attained their goal, they saw their efforts frustrated and were refused the fruits of their hard work. This was the general feeling among Lufthansa staff during the war and early post-war period. The Atlantic orientation, however - highly successful in their view - was to create the main strategic impulse for the re-foundation of the Lufthansa in 1955.

In the Hands of the Luftwaffe: Lufthansa and the Re-arming of Germany 

In all European countries, subsidising the aviation industry was also based on military considerations. In Germany, this was particularly true after 1933.
However, the generous support given to aviation in the 1920s also had predominantly military reasons. With the friendly toleration of the Reich, Junkers had started to build an aircraft factory near Moscow. The horrendous losses of this enterprise finally led to the Reich balancing the books against a majority share in the Junkers business.
Lufthansa director Eberhard Milch changed to the post of secretary of state in the Reich's Ministry for Aviation as early as 1933. On 13 June 1933 he instructed the aircraft industry: "The supreme aim of all work in aviation is the creation of air forces." The whole industry, including Lufthansa, had to follow this command. Lufthansa's freedom in aircraft procurement was limited, as it was only allowed to purchase planes which could be converted to military use.
Similarly, many technological innovations of Lufthansa only seem understandable and meaningful in the context of strategical military considerations. The catapult boats used on the Atlantic routes are just one example. Among others, they were intended to test starts with a catapult, of interest to the navy. And since catapult planes for war vessels were forbidden in the Begriffsbestimmungen (see above), these trials were done by the Lufthansa.
Another example was the 1932 design for the fast aircraft He 70, delivered December of that year (world records 1933). The model was ordered by Lufthansa for the inner-German express network, but its purchase was evidently based on military considerations. The same is true for the He 111 which, instead of becoming the standard aircraft for express passenger flights, evolved into the standard Luftwaffe bomber.
From 1935, Lufthansa ceased to be a company under private law and was merged into the Reich ministry for aviation, to become in effect a subordinate public authority even though the formal status of an Aktiengesellschaft (limited company) was maintained.
The Lufthansa also functioned as the training ground for the air force. The route Berlin-Königsberg served for the instruments-only and night-flight training of air force pilots. Other camouflaged air force units in the 1930s were, e.g., the so-called "Luftsportzentrale der Reichsautobahn" (air sport section of the motorways), "Reklamestaffel Mitteldeutschland" (Central German publicity squadron), "Fliegerlager des freiwilligen Arbeitsdienstes" (aviation camp of the voluntary labor service), and also the "Süddeutsche Lufthansa GmbH". The business interests of Lufthansa became increasingly secondary to military objectives. A good example for this was Lufthansa's purchasing strategy. The ministry for aviation required all aircraft to be convertible for military use at short notice. Furthermore, as a result of national autarky policy - in itself introduced to prepare for the war - the company was restricted in acquisition policy to the German aircraft market.
When the new Douglas and Boeing aircraft became available in the 1930s, Lufthansa was only permitted to buy a few sample aircraft. Lufthansa was expected to use German technology and thus fell behind its European competitors, in particular KLM and Swissair, who changed to Boeing and/or Lockheed. In 1939, 210 aircraft of these companies were in use by European carriers 66. In limiting purchases to German aircraft, the autarky (Autarky is the quality of being self-sufficient. Usually the term is applied to political states or their economic systems. The latter are called closed economies.) and rearmament policy had serious negative effects on Lufthansa, as similar state policies did in other aircraft-producing countries such as France or England. The aim to support the domestic aviation industry also led to strong pressure on the purchasing strategy of the national carriers. The great advantage of KLM and Swissair both before and after World War II was the fact that their home countries had, apart from Fokker, no aviation industry of their own.
On the other hand, Lufthansa of course also benefited from rearmament in various ways, in particular through the state's willingness to support technological pioneering and expand the network for strategic reasons.
The financial data of Lufthansa for the 1930s showed a constantly rising return on its capital 67. In addition to this, the company could rely on a number of hidden sources from the defense budget which are, however, difficult to quantify in retrospect.

The European Airline: Lufthansa during World War II 

In the inter-war period, the paramilitary character of the Lufthansa was particularly evident. Already close contacts to the military intensified further once the National Socialists had seized power. Nothing illustrates this better than the triple function of Eberhard Milch as director of Lufthansa, secretary of state in the ministry for aviation and air force general from 1933. At the same time, to the general public Lufthansa continued to appear as a civilian enterprise. And as there were now independent military organizations, there was no more need for the military to hide behind Lufthansa.
This ambivalence of a stronger military influence alongside a demonstratively civilian appearance increased with the outbreak of World War II on
September 1939. On the one hand, Lufthansa became part of the war machine, handed over a large part of its pilots and aircraft to the air force and provided maintenance facilities for airplanes behind the front lines. On the other, it now emphasized even more its non-military character and continued "business as usual" until May 1945. This permitted the retention of regular flights to Lisbon until August 1944. Up to the end of 1942, Swissair flew from Zurich to Berlin. The civil character of Lufthansa was in part abused for military purposes. For instance, in the Norwegian campaign, Lufthansa's transport squadron landed in neutral Copenhagen and was refueled there by the Anglo-Dutch Shell following a request by Lufthansa's director von Gablenz, who was at the same time squadron commander in the air force 68.
In 1940 Lufthansa had scheduled flights to 12 European countries. Following the conquests of the Third Reich, it took over aircraft from Air France, Sabena, KLM and many other European competitors. Lufthansa had a monopoly in the Reich and the occupied territories and thus in effect became a "European airline", even though many routes in western Europe had been suspended. Many managers of the post-war Lufthansa were trained during this period.

Conclusions and Outlook 

The Allies forbade the Reich's successors both military and civil aviation in the second Potsdam agreement, much like they had done at Versailles. This time, the prohibitions were much stricter and upheld longer. Only after regaining sovereignty in 1954/55 did both German states found their own airlines again - in the event both using the name Lufthansa. Not until 1963 did the GDR change the name of its flag-carrier to "Interflug", after its "Deutsche Lufthansa" had encountered problems obtaining landing rights. The development strategy of the Federal Republic's post-war Lufthansa reflected, in key areas, both an orientation along the lines of the pre-war company, as well as a distancing from the policies of the same. In particular, the pre-war Lufthansa's Atlantic orientation was resumed and nearly 80% of the first years' investments went into aircraft for the Atlantic routes. By the early 1960s, more than half of turnover was generated on the north Atlantic route. This focus can best be understood as a success "after the fact" and a replacement for the breakthrough in this corridor that had been frustrated by the war. Staff at Lufthansa felt they had been denied the reward for several years' work and should now be compensated. Fortunately, the Atlantic routes soon became a commercial success, and in 1963 Lufthansa for the first time posted no operational losses. While the Atlantic services dominated Lufthansa's post-war strategy in the west for a long time, domestic services for some time continued to retain
deterring image. The strong position of cities and regions of pre-war times was not restored. Inner-German services were treated as a step-child and only considered useful as feeders. Only after the deregulation and competition of this market did Lufthansa change its view and recognize the potential for profits on domestic services.


1. A.D. FISCHER VON Poturzyn, Junkers und die Weltluftfahrt. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte deutscher Luftgeltung 1909-1933, München, Richard Pflaum, 1934, p. 70.
2. Peter FRITZSCHE, A nation of fliers. German aviation and the popular imagination, Cambridge/Mass., 1992. Comparing England with the United States: Joseph J. Corn, The winged gospel. Americas romance with aviation, Oxford, 1983; David EDGERTON, England and the aeroplane. An essay on a militant and technological nation, London, 1991.
3.    See for example: Karl- Albin KRUSE, Karlheinz Graudenz & Hanfried SCHLIEPHAKE, eds., Über den Wolken. Das große Buch der Fliegerei. Die Geschichte der Luftfahrt vom Schwingenflug zur Mondrakete, München, 1962.
4.    Bundesverband der Deutschen Luft- und Raumfahrtindustrie and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Luft- und Raumfahrt Lilienthal-Oberth, eds., Die Deutsche Luftfahrt. Buchreihe über die Entwicklungsgeschichte der deutschen Luftfahrttechnik; Wolfgang WAGNER, Der deutsche Luftverkehr. Die Pionierjahre 1919-1925, Koblenz, Bernard & Graefe, 1987 (Die Deutsche Luftfahrt, vol. 11).
5. Bernd-Marian APPEL, Entwicklungsbedingungen für Luftverkehrsunternehmen in Deutschland 1919-1926, Frankfurt, Peter Lang, 1995. From GDR-perspective: Andreas KIESELBACH, Staatliche Regulierung und Monopolisierung im Luftverkehr Deutschlands und anderer imperialistischer Hauptstaaten. Untersucht für den Konstitutierungszeitraum des neuen Verkehrszweiges unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Luftpost 1918-1929, Diss. Dresden, 1988.
6.    Karl-Dieter SEIFERT, Der deutsche Luftverkehr 1926-1945. Auf dem Weg zum Weltverkehr, Bonn, Bernard und Graefe, 1999 (Die Deutsche Luftfahrt, vol.28).
7.    Rudolf BRAUNBURG, Die Geschichte der Lufthansa. Vom Doppeldecker zum Airbus, Hamburg, Rasch und Röhring, 1991. Apart from a series of aviation novels, the following titles are available from the same author: Rudolf BRAUNBURG, Als Fliegen noch ein Abenteuer war. Der Passagierflug von den Anfängen bis in die Nachkriegszeit, Dortmund, Harenberg, 1988; Rudolf BRAUNBURG, Von der DC 3 zur DC 10. Ein Pilotenleben, Stuttgart, Motorbuch Verlag, 1976; Rudolf BRAUNBURG, Ein Himmel voller Abenteuer. Flüge im Grenzbereich, Stuttgart, Motorbuch Verlag, 1971; Rudolf BRAUNBURG, Atlantikflug, Hamburg, Baken Verlag, 1964.
8.    Joachim WACHTEL, Die Geschichte der Deutschen Lufthansa 1926-1976, Köln, 1976 (regular new editions).
9.    Rudolf BRAUNBURG, Die Geschichte der Lufthansa. Vom Doppeldecker zum Airbus , Hamburg, 1991; DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AG, ed., Die Geschichte der Deutschen Lufthansa, 1926-1984, Köln, 1984.
10.    R.E.G. DAVIES, Lufthansa. An airline and its aircraft, New York, 1991.
11.    Kurt WEIGELT, Von der alten zur neuen Lufthansa, Bad Homburg, 1966; Hans M. BONGERS, Es lag in der Luft. Erinnerungen aus fünf Jahrzehnten Luftverkehr, Düsseldorf/Wien, 1971; Deutscher Luftverkehr. Entwicklung, Politik, Wirtschaft, Organisation. Versuch einer Analyse der Lufthansa, Bad Godesberg, 1967.
1 2.    For a comparative view of eight European carriers see: Hans-Liudger DlENEL & Peter Lyth, eds., Flying the Flag. European Commercial Aviation 1945-1995, London/New York, 1998.
13.    Wolfgang BEHRINGER & Constance Ott-Koptschaluski, Der Traum vom Fliegen. Zwischen Mythos und Technik, Frankfurt, 1991. See also: Hans-Liudger DlENEL, "Ende des Traums vom individuellen Fliegen. Der Weg zum Luftbus", in Dieter R. Bauer & Wolfgang BEHRINGER, eds., Fliegen und Schweben. Annäherung an eine menschliche Sensation, München, 1997, p. 361-385.
14.    Joseph J. CORN, The winged gospel, op. cit.; David EDGERTON, England and the aeroplane, op. cit. ; Peter FRITZSCHE, A nation of fliers, op. cit.
15.    Guillaume DE SYON, The socio-politics of technology. The Zeppelin in official and popular culture 1900-1933, Diss. Boston, 1994.
16.    The obvious and lively air-mindedness resp. "Luftgesinnung" was already observed by contemporaries: A.D. FISCHER VON POTURZYN, Junkers und die Weltluftfahrt. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte deutscher Luftgeltung 1909-1933, München, Richard Pflaum, 1934, p. 68.
17.    Some examples: Hans WACHTER, Entwicklung und wirtschaftliche Bedeutung des Luftverkehrs, Diss. Erlangen, 1925; Gerhard VOSS, Die Subventionierung des deutschen Luftverkehrs, Diss. Königsberg, 1935; Paul Maacks, Der deutsche Flugzeugverkehr und seine volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung, Diss. Giessen, 1926; Günther Haack, Die Entwicklung des deutschen Luftverkehrs, Diss. München, 1928; Erich BEERMANN, Die Eingliederung der Luftfahrt in das deutsche Verkehrswesen, Diss. Göttingen, 1926; Konrad HAMANN, Deutschland im Weltluftverkehr, Diss. Berlin, 1936; Hennann PANNIER, Wirtschaftliche Probleme des Flugzeugverkehrs, Diss., Berlin, 1937; Ilse WOLF, Die Verdichtung des Flugnetzes und des Flugplanes unter Berücksichtigung des deutsche Luftverkehrs in der Zeit von 1919-1939, Diss. Heidelberg, 1940.
18.    Carl PlRATH, Der Schnellverkehr in der Luft und seine Stellung im neuzeitlichen Verkehrswesen, Berlin, 1935 (Forschungsergebnisse des Verkehrswissenschaftlichen Instituts für Luftfahrt an der T.H. Stuttgart, vol. 8).
19.    E.g. in the short, more statistical study of John L. KNEIFEL, A study on the choice of international transportation - cars, trains, planes -. Its assessment and synthesis, with special regard to the sociological aspects, Berlin, 1976. From the same author: John L. KNEIFEL, Der Wettbewerb im nordatlantischen Luftverkehr. Eine Untersuchung der Wettbewerbsverhältnisse und Wettbewerbsfaktoren, Diss. Freiburg, München, 1967.
20.    Werner Treibel, Geschichte der deutschen Verkehrsflughäfen. Eine Dokumentation von 1909 bis 1989, Bonn, 1992. For the GDR: Joachim GRENZDÖRFER & Karl-Dieter SEIFERT, eds., Geschichte des ostdeutschen Verkehrsflughäfen, Bonn, 1997.
21.    Deutsches Museum München, Sondersammlungen und Archive; Firmenarchiv of the Deutsche Lufthansa AG in Köln.
22.    Archiv der Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher Verkehrsflughäfen, Stuttgart-Flughafen; Archiv der DASA, Standort Bremen, Standort Ottobrunn.
23.    Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Deutsches Reiche (Berlin-Lichterfelde), Reichswirtschaftsministerium, Deutsche Bank (Deutsche Bank und Luft Hansa); Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes.
24.    Guillaume RS. De Syon, The socio-politics of technology, op. cit., p. 152-157.
25.    Claude DORNIER, Aus meiner Ingenieurlaufbahn. Zug (Privatdruck), 1966.
26.    Quotes based on Wolfgang Behringer & Constance Ott-Koptschaluski, Der Traum vom Fliegen, op. cit., p. 368.
27.    Henry C. MEYER, Airshipmen, Businessmen and Politics 1890-1940, Washington, Smithsonian, 1991; Guillaume De Syon, The socio-politics, op.cit., p. 243-246.
28.    Joachim BREITHAUPT, Mit Graf Zeppelin nach Süd- und Nordamerika. Reiseeindrücke und Fahrterlebnisse, Lahr, 1930; Hugo ECKENER, Im Zeppelin über Land und Meere, Flensburg, 1949.
29.    Rudolf BRAUNBURG, Die Geschichte, op. cit., p. 43.
30.    Hugo ECKENER, Luftschiff und Luftverkehr. Letzte Errungenschaften und Zukunftsperspektiven in uraltem Streben, Stuttgart, Greiner & Pfeiffer, 1910.
31.    Hans G. KNÄUSEL, Zeppelm and the United States of America. An important episode in German-American Relations, Friedrichshafen, Zeppelin, 1981; Margaret I. GOLDSMITH, Zeppelin. A Bibliography, New York, Morrow, 1931.
32.    G. DE Syon, The socio-politics, op. cit, p. 229.
33.    Eugen BENTELE, Ein Zeppelin Maschinist erzählt. Meine Fahrten 1931-1938, Friedrichshafen, 1991, p. 19.
34.    Hermann KOHL, Im Zeppelin nach Südamerika. Berlin 1934; Rolf BRANDT, Mit Luftschiff Hindenburg über den Atlantik. Das Buch vom Sieg eines deutschen Gedankens, Berlin, Scherl, 1936.
35.    Harold G. DICK & Douglas ROBINSON, The Golden Age of the great Passenger Airships, Graf Zeppelin and Hindenburg, Washington, Smithsonian, 1985.
36.    Manfred BAUER & John DUGGAN, LZ 130 „Graf Zeppelin" und das Ende der Verkehrsluftschiffahrt, Immenstaad, 1994, p. 187-203.
37.    The concept of "Technological Momentum" stems from Thomas Hughes. He argues that technological success determines a momentum for similar developments and strategies.
38.    Versailles Agreement, part v, section III, Reichsgesetzblatt, 1919, p. 957.
39.    Julius C. ROTTA, Die Aerodynamische Versuchsanstalt in Göttingen. Ein Werk Ludwig Prandtls, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990.
40.    Paul HaNLE, Bringing Aerodynamics to America, Cambridge/Mass.-London, 1982; Helmuth Trischler, Luft- und Raumfahrtforschung in Deutschland 1900-1970. Politische Geschichte einer Wissenschaft, Frankfurt, Campus, 1992, p. 198-226; Helmuth TRISCHLER, Dokumente zur Geschichte der Luft- und Raumfahrtforschung in Deutschland 1900-1970, Köln, DLR, 1993.
41.    Peter Fritzsche, "Machine Dreams. Airmindedness and the Reinvention of Germany", in American Historical Review, vol. 98, 1993, p. 685-709.
42.    A. D. FISCHER VON POTURZYN, Junkers, op.cit. .
43.    Stefan ITTNER, Dieselmotoren für die Luftfahrt. Innovation und Tradition im J unker s- Flugmotorenbau bis 1933, Oberhaching, Aviatic, 1996.
44.    Dimitri A. SOBOLEW, Deutsche Luftfahrtforscher in der Sowjetunion von 1945-1953, Hamburg, Mittler, 2000; D.A. SOBOLEW, Nemetskii sled ν istorii sovetskoi aviatsii. Ob uchastii nemetskikh spetsialistov ν razvitii aviastweniia ν SSSR, Moskva, Aviatik, 1 996; MINISTRY OF AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION, ed., German Aeronautical Developments, London, 1946.
45.    R. BRAUNBURG, Die Geschichte, op. cit., p. 134.
46.    Robert ESPEROU, "Les fondements de la politique française du transport aérien", in L'Aviation civile et commerciale des années 1920 à nos jours, Paris, 1993, p. 245-259.
47.    Enthusiasm for the unconventional thinker Hugo Junkers and his work lasts until today. For the inter-war period: Verein DEUTSCHER INGENIEURE, ed., Festschrift für Professor Hugo. Junkers zum 70. Geburtstag, Berlin, 1929. For the GDR: Günter SCHMITT, "Professor Hugo Junkers und seine Flugzeuge", in Günter SCHMITT et al., eds., Junkers. Bildatlas aller Flugzeugtypen, Stuttgart, 1988, p. 8-34.
48.    Paul MaaCKS, Oer deutsche Flugzeugverkehr, op. cit., p. 28-31.
49.    James Woolley & Earl W. Hill, Airplane Transportation, Hollywood, Harwell, 1929, p. 77.
50.    Hans MÜLLER, Der Wirtschaftskampf der deutschen Flugzeugindustrie nach dem Kriege, Diss. Tübingen, 1936, p. 52-63.
51.    Aero-Lloyd, Aero-Hansa, Aero-Lloyd-Luftbild, Deutsch-Russische Luftverkehrs GmbH, Mitteldeutsche Aero-Lloyd, Luftverkehrs AG Württemberg, Luftverkehrs AG Westfalen, Adria-Aero-Lloyd, Condor Syndicat, Badisch-Pfälzische Luftverkehrs AG, Süddeutsche Aero-Lloyd, Hessische Flugbetriebs GmbH, Bodensee Aero-Lloyd GmbH, Danziger Aero- Lloyd, Austro-Lloyd. Cf.: Aero-Lloyd Konzern, Berlin, 1925.
52.    Hans STAUDINGER, Der Staat als Unternehmer, Berlin, Gersbach, 1929, p. 70-77; Gerhard VOSS, Die Subventionierung, op. cit.
53.    Erich BEERMANN, Die Eingliederung der Luftfahrtop, cit., p. 78-80.
54.    R. BRAUNBURG, Die Geschichte, op. cit., p. 42.
55.    A summary is provided in G. VOSS, Die Subventionierung, op. cit., Anlage IV und V.
56.    Carl PlRATH, Der Schnellverkehr, op. cit.; Heinz Schenk, Finanzierung und Organisation des Luftverkehrs unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Verhältnisse, Diss. Frankfurt/Main, 1930.
57.    Joseph ZIEGLER, Die Bedeutung des Luft-Linienverkehrs im neuzeitlichen Transportsystem. Ein Beitrag zur Ökonomie des deutschen Luftverkehrs, Dresden, Bittert, 1938, p. 64.
58.    Hans-Liudger Dienel, "Der Neuaufbau der zivilen Luftfahrt im deutsch-deutschen Vergleich", in Technikgeschichte, vol. 63, 1996, p. 285-303; Hans-Liudger DlENEL, "Lufthansa: Two German Airlines", in Hans-Liudger DlENEL & Peter Lyth, eds., Flying the Flag, op. cit., p. 87-126, 98-100.
59.    Grete WaSHKÖNIG, Die Verkehrsunternehmen des Reiches als öffentliche Unternehmen und die Bedeutung für die deutsche Finanzwirtschaft, Diss. Bonn, 1939, p. 82-83
60.    Werner TREIBEL, Geschichte der deutschen Verkehrsflughäfen, Koblenz, Graefe und Unzer, 1992, p. 17.
61.    Peter Fritzsche, A nation of fliers, op.cit., p. 200-201.
62.    Hans-Liudger Dienel, "Ins Grüne und ins Blaue. Freizeitverkehr im West-Ost- Vergleich. BRD und DDR 1949-1990", in Hans-Liudger Dienel & Barbara Schmucki, eds., Mobilität für Alle, Stuttgart, 1997, p. 221-250.
63.    Hans-Liudger DlENEL, "Ende des Traums vom individuellen Fliegen. Der Weg zum Luftbus", in Dieter R. BAUER & Wolfgang Behringer, eds., Fliegen und Schweben, op. cit., p. 361-385.
64. Hans-Liudger DlENEL, Herrschaft über die Natur. Natiuvorstellungen deutscher Ingenieure 1871 -1914, Stuttgart, 1992, p. 175.
65. Erhard MILCH, Vorbereitungen zum transozeanischen Luftverkehr, Berlin, 1928 (press conference at the Wannsee near Berlin).
66.    R. BRAUNBURG, Die Geschichte, op. cit., p. 139.
67.    Hans M. BONGERS, Deutschlands Anteil am Weltluftverkehr, Leipzig, 1938.
68. R. BRAUNBURG, Die Geschichte, op. cit., p. 156.


Martin Schiefelbusch , Hans-Liudger Dienel   lien Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire  lien   Année   2000   lien Volume   78   lien Numéro   78-3-4   lien pp. 945-967

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